Experimentação animal pre-eutanásia: Parte 1

Por Joel Ferraz, médico veterinário e Mestre em bioética
Este post devia se calhar antes ter o cabeçalho Experimentação animal peri-eutanasia (proximo da eutanasia), porque a pergunta que aborda é:
Qual é o mal de experimentar num cadáver?

Em termos de sofrimento, parece claro que não vão existir implicações. Experimentar num cadáver, não vai alterar o seu bem-estar, pois, depois da morte, no corpo deixa de existir a capacidade de sentir prazer ou sofrimento, tanto quanto nos é possível inferir.

Quanto à vida, deixa de haver constrangimento, porque ela já não existe. Já não há risco ou possibilidade de se ameaçar esse valor.
E quanto à dignidade do ser? Aqui as opiniões vão estar sujeitas a muitos outros factores, nomeadamente, do que se entende por dignidade, em que medida ela existe num ser-vivo morto (e, se sim, se é no corpo que ela continua a existir, ou se é noutro sítio diferente), do que se vai experimentar, de que forma e por quem vai ser feita a experiência, entre outros. A dignidade de um ser pode ser posta em causa quando ele está a ser instrumentalizado, independentemente do seu bem-estar e da sua vida? A instrumentalização de um cadáver, para o bem de outros sujeitos, pode ferir a sua dignidade? Aparentemente, esta questão da dignidade trará muitas voltas, menos consentâneas que a questão do sofrimento e da questão da vida. (continua)

Experimentação animal pré-eutanásia

Em 3 mensagens (Parte 1, Parte 2, Parte 3) segue uma reflexão do médico veterinário e mestre em bioética Joel Ferraz sobre o problema ético de experimentação em animais, visto na perspectiva da recente debate sobre o uso no ensino veterinário de animais vindos do canil municipal.
O termo experimentação é algo ambíguo no contexto, e na minha ligeira revisão dos posts optei por manter esta ambiguidade. Pode por um lado tratar-se de uma experiência científica em que se procura saber algo que ninguém sabe. Mas pode também se tratar de um aluno que experimenta técnicas que para ele são novas, embora já são conhecidas e descritas por outros.
Esta observação é relevante porque como temos visto em discussões anteriores, é explicitamente proibido (Directiva 86/609/CEE, transposta pelo Decreto-Lei 129/92, de 6 de Julho 1992) usar cães e gatos vadios na experimentação científica, mas a lei não é clara sobre o seu uso no ensino. No entanto, como já se reflectiu aqui varias vezes, nem todos os actos legais são moralmente indiscutíveis. Mais, um acto pode ser ilegal apesar de ser de muitas perspectivas moralmente correcto.

Alternatives to animal use – part 6

Finally, the Freudian slip. Or maybe the last-speech-before-lunch effect. 
This lecture (all lectures now available here) was given by Gianni Dal Nigro, veterinarian and toxicologist from GlaxoSmithKline. He reported from the EPAA workshop Combining excellence in science and animal welfare, held in October this year, which gave a number of recommendations for the future activity of the EPAA.
Images borrowed from the EPAA website
Typing and listening at the same time, I understood the first of these recommendations (which reads “keeping Replacement as the ultimate goal”) as “skipping Replacement as the ultimate goal”.  I found this really interesting, definitively daring but rather coherent with Richard Fosse’s lecture. So, when  the time for post-lecture questions came, I took the chance to ask more or less the following:
Thank you for a very interesting presentation. I find it interesting that you have decided to skip Replacement as the ultimate goal, and I wanted to ask you if the workshop took this decision because it is not possible to reach replacement in the foreseeable time, or because it is not considered a relevant aim. I will explain why I’m asking the question. As has already been commented on by others, the animal use we are talking about in this conference is only about 10-15% of the total numbers of animals used in experimentation. And if we look at the overall use of animals, it is an even smaller fraction. Interestingly, we never discuss Replacement or even Reduction as regards animal production for human consumption, although the nuimbers are much larger and the amount of suffering is often considerable. Why is it, then, that it’s so important to replace the use of animals in testing? Are we really investing the efforts where they are best needed?
The answer was not very clear, which I now fully well understand, as what I asked must have made no sense whatsoever to the speaker, who had said something completely different. But the question remains. Why is it that using animals in research is such a questionable activity that we ought to make every effort to avoid it, when using animals for food production is reasonably accepted? 
One can turn the question around: why don’t we discuss the 3Rs for animal production? 


Alternative approaches to animal testing – part 5

Or how through a Freudian slip this blogger asked an inconvenient question at the conference. 
Of the talks I was able to follow at the EPAA conference before I had to head for the airport at 15h, there are two I haven’t yet presented. This is of course because they were the two that sparked long chains of thoughts which I had yet to sort out. 
The first was an outstanding – yes, I will be subjective here, I had not heard this speaker before and I was very impressed by the way he delivered a number of subtle but extremely well formulated key messages – talk by Richard Fosse, a veterinarian and laboratory animal scientist who will play a leading role in the EPAA over the next five-year period. Fosse opened by referring to the enormous challenges facing regulatory testing, as industry moves from blockbuster drugs to individualized medicine, and from active substances which are molecules to those which are fragments of proteins and expected to interfere with the action of individual cells. (This means, in more everyday language, drugs which act on increasingly small and specific aspects of the body). The more a drug is designed to act specifically on the body of the patient to be treated, the more difficult it will be to make generalizations from simpler systems or across species. For example, how to test a human-specific antibody fragment to ensure that it is safe for humans? This, argued Fosse, will lead away from the conventional rodent toxicology tests over to the use of humanized mice and primates for studies in which “entire animals are absolutely indispensable”. 
Fosse highlighted that while the EPAA works only on testing, by far most animals – somewhere between 60 and 80% are not used for testing but for research. When exploring new terrain, the challenges as regards the 3Rs and specifically replacement are different – the idea of replacing a process we are still trying to understand is “a semantic trap”. Based on the observation that “academia is totally dependent at the moment and for the foreseeable future on access to animals”, Fosse underlined how crucial it is that the near future focus of EPAA will be on the 2Rs, reduction and refinement. 
Another challenge highlighted is how to measure how effective the 3Rs are, in relation to how much research is being done. “The more we use transgenic animals, the more animals we seem to need”, in what is the typical cycle of research: a new model becomes a new resource through which much more can be explored, it leads to more research which gives new knowledge which can then be used to build alternative approaches. 
It seems Fosse was mainly talking about using animals, rather than about alternative approaches, and about research rather than testing. This may seem odd in the context of the conference but I think there is an important meaning and message. 

Replacement is very selling – successful replacement reflects both scientific and moral progress. Replacement is also consensual – a manifesto which can be signed by scientists and animal rights activists alike. 

But it is precisely in the fact that replacement sells so well that there is a risk. The 2Rs initiative is one illustration of this: specific 3Rs funding goes exclusively to replacement, leaving reduction and refinement to fend for themselves. This is related to the even bigger risk that in well-meaning political correctness we actually oversell replacement. Opponents to the use of animals in research capitalize on this. They argue that scientists are reactionary when defending the use of animals in science, that this is old-fashioned and that replacements are available. We’ve seen it very frequently in the recent discussion in Portugal sparked by the Azambuja animal facility plan. If replacement is possible, then why even thinking of reduction and refinement?
The problem is, to the best of our present scientific knowledge, replacement isn’t possible, at least not throughout and at least not now. (This doesn’t mean all animal use in science is important and morally unquestionable. It may be a perfectly valid moral view to say that we have no right to use animals in science (it’s not a view that I share, but it’s a view I respect). But to say that using animals is oldfashioned and irrelevant because there are alternatives is argue on a very questionable fact base.) And this is a message scientists will have to work hard to be able to sell in a trustworthy way. 
There’s another issue in this, which cropped up informally in the discussion. The EPAA  works exclusively on animal testing, and animal testing is probably the particular black sheep in the public view of animal experimentation. It’s probably also the one part of animal experimentation which is most difficult to defend morally, because the long-term benefit of testing new substances is often mainly economical. But it is also a rather small proportion of animal experimentation – some 10-15%. The largest proportion of experimental animals are used in research, where replacement is much more difficult. To only concentrate efforts to replace the use of animals in what is already a minor proportion of overall numbers may be seen as disproportionate. 
Even more so as the number of animals used for experimentation is only a very small fraction of the total number of animals used for human benefit. Which takes me to my Freudian slip.
(to be continued)

Animal welfare in Europe or Alternatives to animal use – part 4

“Animal welfare is a very important European issue. Animals have rights”. These were the words of European Commissioner John Dalli, Health and Consumer Policy, in his opening speech at the EPAA conference. 
It is sometimes refreshing, sometimes frustrating for an academic researcher to hear a non-academic state as a fact what we may spend careers discussing, questioning and redefining. In this particular case, I’m not sure how much more we can get from discussing whether animals are the sort of beings that can have rights. (Although I couldn’t help recalling the discussion developing in Portugal two years ago when lawyer and centre-right *politician Paulo Rangel provocatively declared Animais não têm direitos – Animals don’t have rights).
But I know it’s important that a European Commissioner states that animal welfare is a very important European issue. This means that the issue is on the European agenda and that we can expect more EU activities focusing on animal welfare. This is clearly visible in the EU animal welfare policy, which Dalli highlighted.
*More specifically, Member of the European Parliament for PSD, the party once led by present European Commission president José Manuel Durão Barroso

Alternative approaches to animal testing – part 3

Blogging directly from the meeting room is exciting and inspiring but challenging and – not surprisingly! – not fully compatible with engaging in the discussion. Computer at hand, I could at least write down fragments to use when actually composing the remaining posts on the plane back. Here’s what the second session was about:
Friedlieb Pfannkuch, Roche, gave an international perspective on initiatives to promote and implement the 3Rs in regulatory testing. He showed the long list of which are legally required before a new drug can be launched on the market . A powerful illustration of what a challenge it is to make changes here, because so many changes are needed. Essentially, Pfannkuch was arguing for developing increasingly sophisticated approaches in which one looks at how small doses affect critical processes in animals, and for the systematic improvement of the reliability of safety tests (animal and non-animal tests alike) in accurately predicting what will happen in humans.
David Gallacher, Johnson& Johnson, presented one such initiative: the animal model framework. Through a series of teleconferences and sharing of data, several pharmaceutical companies work together to evaluate how good different tests are at making accurate predictions, and how they can be improved in this sense. The first results of this initiative are expected to be published in the beginning of 2011.
Ngaine Dennison from the UK Home Office presented the results of a 15-year preoccupation with reduction and refinement initiatives within one single test: the mouse bioassay for shellfish toxin. An illustrative example of how one can reason in this situation by combining scientific/technical and practical/economical considerations.  This means asking questions like
  • Can we administer the sample in a way that causes less harm to the animals?
  • Can we reduce the duration of the test? 
  • Can we anaesthetize the animals to reduce suffering?
Joanna Edwards from the not-for-profit organizaton Lhasa limited presented the existing databases and softwares for data sharing in the life sciences. The idea behind this type of initiatives is to bring together existing information about substances into large and sophisticated databases. The more complete and versatile such databases are, the further they can be used to make predictions.

Alternative approaches to animal testing – part 2

Right now, Timo Nevalainen from the University of Eastern Finland is opening the second morning session, on the 2Rs in regulatory testing. The 2Rs is the central theme of this year’s conference and stands for Reduction and Refinement – that is the 2Rs which applies when animals are actually used rather than being replaced. This is an important notion and I think there’s quite some tension here between a politically correct but not necessarily realistic focus in the official discourse.

Two of this morning’s speakers made this tension very evident. Emily McIvor from Humane Society International stressed that the ultimate goal must be replacement and Richard Fosse from EPAA stressed that in the foreseeable future we will continue to need to do research on entire animals. Both of these statements are probably right – but what frustrates many laboratory animal scientists today is that strategic funding initiatives are very biased towards replacement. But only to fund research on replacement is rather much like only funding research into alternative car fuels and ignore efforts to reduce the pollution from existing combustion engines. Moreover, it’s probably deceiving the public into believing that replacement of animal research is really around the corner.

The 2Rs initiative which Timo Nevalainen headed a couple of years ago was an attempt to change this. In a document signed by some 50 scientific societies and animal welfare associations, the European Commission was asked to consider funding Reduction and Refinement research in the 7th Framework Program for research. It wasn’t successful -still Replacement is the only one of the 3Rs which have dedicated funding from the European Commission.

Alternative approaches to animal testing – part 1

Today I’m blogging live from Brussels, from the annual conference of the European Partnership for Alternative Approaches to Animal Testing. This is a collaboration between the European Commission and industry to promote alternatives. 

Before going on to reporting from the different talks, let me clarify two key issues:

Animal testing is a very specific part of the larger concept of animal use for scientific and other experimental purposes. It means the use of animals to test substances (pharmaceutical drugs, industry chemicals etc) in order to evaluate whether it is safe to use these substances for the purpose they are intended. Research which is intended to develop those substances or understand how they can be used to treat diseases in the case of drugs, or to kill insects in the case of pesticides, is not animal testing.

Alternative approaches is a tricky expression. Alternatives are not only those which replace animals, but also those that reduce the number of animals and those that refine the way animals are used so that suffering is minimized. That is, all the 3Rs as defined by Russell and Burch in 1959 are considered alternatives.

Uso de animais de companhia no ensino – Parte 3

(Ver Parte 1 e Parte 2)

Pese embora a aparente ausência de ilícito penal, haverá indícios da existência de ilícito moral na utilização (única) de cães vadios para fins didácticos?

A Bastonária da OMV opõe-se à utilização de animais vivos excepto “quando o procedimento [como anestesias, cirurgias e exames] possa ser um bem para o próprio animal” (Jornal Público, 19-11). Recorrendo ao equilíbrio reflexivo, Laurentina Pedroso argumenta ainda que “Tudo deve ser feito com grande rigor e com respeito pelo animal“.
Por outro lado, o colega Joel Ferraz, em entrevista ao Canal UP a 18-11, utiliza uma análise custo-benefício para, dentro da tradição utilitarista, legitimar esta opção: “Em termos éticos, e no que diz respeito ao sofrimento e valor da vida animal, não reprovo, quando comparado com o considerado normal, que é criar animais especificamente para fins científicos ou pedagógicos. Pode considerar-se moralmente mais aceitável usar um animal que não tinha utilidade e cujo destino seria a eutanásia, do que um animal saudável criado e destinado à experimentação”.

E aqui reside o ponto fundamental: de que forma a instrumentalização de um cão vadio é moralmente mais condenável do que recorrer a um beagle classificado com a categoria D (cão para investigação científica)? Em nenhum deles o procedimento é utilizado para o bem do próprio. E este raciocínio pode ser alargado para incluir as palpações transrectais em vacas de refugo, venopunções em ovinos, intubações nasogástricas em asininos ou outros animais que não servem outro propósito que não o ensino. E portanto a questão ética basilar não se resume aos animais vadios mas sim à utilização de animais vivos no ensino práctico da medicina veterinária, sem benefício dos próprios. Se, como sociedade, não estamos preparados para recorrer a animais vadios para fins didácticos, pela mesma ordem de razão não devemos aceitar nenhuma das práticas anteriores. (continua)

Uso de animais de companhia no ensino – Parte 2

Vou continuar a analisar o enquadramento legal do uso de animais vadios no ensino da Medicina Veterinária (ver Parte 1). Algumas vozes têm vindo a público denunciar a ilegalidade dessa utilização mas é-me difícil encontrar algum ilícto penal a menos que os animais sejam sujeitos a “dor e sofrimento consideráveis” como no caso das intervenções repetidas.

A jurista Alexandra Moreira diz estarem a ser cometidas “pelos menos duas ilegalidades. Os animais não podem ser utilizados para fins didácticos nem cedidos pelos canis a outros que não sejam particulares ou associações zoófilas”. Na verdade, a primeira afirmação não é verdadeira porque – como vimos anteriormente – a lei prevê excepções aos fins didácticos e o uso de animais no contexto clínico veterinário não está abrangido pela protecção a animais utilizados para fins experimentais. Quanto à segunda, a legislação é ambígua. Se por um lado o DL 315/2003 diz que “os animais não reclamados… podem ser alienados pelas câmaras municipais… por cedência gratuita quer a particulares quer a instituições zoófilas devidamente legalizadas…” (Art 19º, ponto 4.), por outro o DL 314/2003 afirma que “nos casos de não reclamação de posse, as câmaras municipais devem anunciar… a existência destes animais com vista à sua cedência, quer a particulares, quer a entidades públicas ou privadas que demonstrem possuir os meios necessários à sua detenção…” (Art.9º, ponto 4.). À luz deste último decreto, e cumprindo todos os demais quesitos, um Hospital Veterinário Universitário parece enquadrar-se dentro do imperativo legal.

Mas aqui surge a questão de os animais serem cedidos ao Hospital Veterinário, não para serem adoptados mas, em última instância, para serem eutanasiados. Maria do Ceú Sampaio, presidente da Liga Portuguesa dos Direitos dos Animais, afirma que “as câmaras municipais não podem transferir responsabilidades, como a da eutanásia, para as instituições de ensino. A lei é clara e não o permite.” De facto, o DL 315/2003 declara ser competência das “câmaras municipais a recolha, captura e abate compulsivo de animais de companhia” (Art.19º, ponto 1) mas torna-se muito complicado alegar transferência de responsabilidades se o Veterinário Municipal alegar estar a ceder os animais a uma instituição pública com condições para os receber. O destino posterior dado aos animais passa a ser responsabilidade dessa instituição e não do veterinário municipal, que ainda assim tem o dever de monitorizar as condições de detenção dos animais por si cedidos. Considero que a questão fundamental reside em determinar quem autoriza a eutanásia: se o veterinário municipal se o Hospital Veterinário.

E então retornamos ao ponto inicial: pese embora a aparente ausência de ilícito penal, haverá indícios da existência de ilícito moral? Retomaremos a este assunto oportunamente. (continua)